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Although consumers typically expect organizations to profit from marketing goods and services, 
they also believe that certain organizations, like those that focus on religion and health, should 
prioritize communal obligations. Indeed, consumers may find it morally distressing when 
communally-focused organizations use overtly commercial marketing strategies like rebranding 
or value-based pricing. We demonstrate how moral distress and consumer backlash result from 
such taboo trade-offs and investigate when communal-sharing rhetoric for religious and 
pharmaceutical marketing reduces distress. Communal justifications used by communally-
focused organizations are particularly effective when consumers are not closely monitoring the 
motives of the organization or when the product is need-based. However, communal 
justifications become less effective and market-pricing justifications become more effective 
when consumers are attuned to the persuasive intentions of the organization.  Implications for 
consumer goals are discussed.  
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Although consumers expect organizations to profit from marketing goods and services, 
they prefer that certain types of organizations abide by communal obligations. Consumers should 
therefore perceive a normative breach, or a taboo trade-off, when organizations operating within 
communally-focused domains, like religion and healthcare, rely on commercial marketing 
strategies like rebranding or value-priced pricing. Commercial marketing that is especially 
transparent may anger consumers and cause backlash against the organization. We use religious 
and pharmaceutical marketing as case studies to examine negative response to commercial-
marketing in communally-focused domains. We also test the efficacy of rhetorical justifications, 
which highlight communal aspects of organizational practices, to assuage distress and reduce 
backlash. 
Religious organizations are using commercial marketing techniques to compete with the 
secular world for the allegiance of worshipers. Because congregants generally believe that a 
church’s purpose is to promote communal endeavors (and not simply recruit paying members), 
we question whether these strategies undermine the perceived sanctity of religious organizations 
and gauge the extent to which communally-focused justifications restore that sanctity. Likewise, 
in the domain of healthcare, consumers tend to favor a communal focus and often endorse the 
view that medical care should be provided as needed rather than on the ability or willingness to 
pay. As with religious consumers, healthcare consumers should be distressed by transparent 
commercial strategies that signal a market approach to patient care. This seems particularly 
salient for pharmaceuticals and the value-pricing of lifesaving drugs (Gregson, Sparrowhawk, 
Mauskopf, and Paul 2005). What both types of organizations have in common is that they may 
successfully justify their behavior by shifting perceptions to communal responsibilities.  
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The use of commercial marketing strategies in communal domains has important 
implications for consumer goals and well-being. Successful commercial marketing strategies 
may benefit consumers by encouraging religious participation and medication adherence, both of 
which have been associated with better health and longer life (McCullough and Willoughby 
2009). However, if commercial strategies suggest a conspicuous market approach to religion and 
healthcare, then consumers may be alienated and either disengage or lash out.  
In what follows, we present a model that predicts the thoughts, feelings and behaviors 
that result when commercial marketing strategies appear in communally-focused domains. We 
then examine the processes by which consumer distress may be rhetorically mitigated.   
 
Fiske’s Theory of Social Relations and Taboo Trade-offs by Organizations 
Fiske’s (1991, 1992) social relational theory documents four extensively validated 
categories of norms that organize our social world (Haslam 2004): communal sharing, authority 
ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. Our inquiry focuses on the individualist and 
collectivist endpoints of Fiske’s continuum:  
Market Pricing (MP): People give and take according to a value or utility metric, 
typically money, which group members can freely exchange based on cost-benefit 
analysis of consumer value. The structure underlies capitalism and business transactions.  
 
Communal Sharing (CS): People give as they can and take as they need.  Group members 
are treated as a community and share rights and responsibilities designated by their 
ability and needs. The structure underlies sharing a commons (e.g., kibbutzim or co-op), 
family, or other close (e.g., agapic) relationships. 
 
We extend the theory to address interactions of consumers with organizations (March 
1994). Although most organizations (profit and non-profit) rely on a market-pricing approach, 
consumers sometimes believe that organizations ought to be subject to communal-sharing 
obligations. Prior research shows that organizations can be viewed in non-market terms; a bank, 
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for example, can elicit communal expectations based on past communal behavior (Aggarwal 
2004), and consumers can view service relationships with restaurants and travel agencies as a 
friendship (Wan, Hui, and Wyer 2011). These expectations arise because consumers can develop 
relationships with companies that parallel interpersonal relationships (Fournier 1998).  
We explore what happens when consumers desire (and even expect) communal-sharing 
behavior from an organization but receive market-pricing behavior instead. Actions that extend 
market-pricing norms into spheres traditionally regulated by communal-sharing norms constitute 
a taboo trade-off (Fiske and Tetlock 1997; McGraw, Tetlock and Kristel 2003). Empirical 
evidence identifies two reactions to taboo trade-offs (Rai and Fiske 2011; Tetlock et al. 2000): 
moral outrage and moral cleansing. 
Moral Outrage. The sacred-value-protection model (Tetlock 2002) suggests that taboo 
trade-offs are disturbing because they reduce sacred values that are meant to be infinitely 
important, such as faith, dignity or life, to finite monetary values (Baron and Spranca 1997; 
Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 1996). People are quick to criticize those who create taboo trade-
offs. For instance, the public was outraged when they found that the Clinton administration 
provided major campaign contributors a night’s stay in the Lincoln bedroom (McGraw and 
Tetlock 2005). Consumers become similarly distressed when companies that foster a communal 
relationship revert to market-pricing, such as charging fees for simple requests (Aggarwal 2004).  
Moral Cleansing.  Merely contemplating taboo trade-offs can threaten one’s moral 
identity (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2002) and elicit feelings of disgust (Haidt and Algoe 2004). 
These feelings, in turn, motivate people to morally “cleanse” themselves. For example, people 
were more likely to volunteer for an organ donation campaign after reading about an 
administrator’s choice between funding a lifesaving operation for a boy and purchasing hospital 
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beds (Tetlock et al. 2000). Other moral cleansing acts take the form of backlash – such as 
boycotts, political lobbying, or negative word of mouth – in an effort to punish communal 
organizations that adopt commercial strategies. For example, doctors called for a boycott of 
Abbott Laboratories after finding out about the company’s 400% price increase, which was 
designed to steer patients to a new HIV drug (Harris 2004).  
 
Relational Framing by Organizations 
Taboo trade-offs are cognitively taxing and emotionally unpleasant; they are aversive 
states that people prefer to avoid (Gross 1998, 2002; Ehrich and Irwin 2005; Luce, Bettman and 
Payne 1997; Nowlis, Kahn and Dhar 2002). Thus, consumers who are offered justifications that 
reframe taboo trade-offs into something less distressing may forgive companies that transgress 
(Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004; McGraw and Tetlock 2005). 
In our inquiry, we explore how organizations reframe their market-pricing strategies into 
communal-sharing behavior (e.g. "Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there”). Previous research 
supports our notion that relational framing can assuage distress over market-pricing strategies 
(Tuk, Verlegh, Smidts, and Wigboldus 2009). For instance, the Clinton administration 
effectively justified granting favors to campaign donors by invoking the norm of reciprocity: 
friends (Clintons) returning a favor to friends (donors; Cialdini 2001; McGraw and Tetlock 
2005). Similarly, we examine how organizations in religion and healthcare can use communal 
rhetoric to neutralize negative reactions to commercial marketing strategies.  
Organizations offering justifications may successfully manage consumer impressions 
because consumers’ default cognitive reaction is to readily accept justifications, particularly 
when it is difficult to process information and weigh the credibility of claims (Kunda 1990; 
Gilbert, Krull, and Malone 1990; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Tetlock, 2002; Tuk et al. 2009). 
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Insofar as the public is not invested in monitoring church or corporate misconduct, churches and 
corporations may have considerable latitude to assuaging reactions to apparent norm violations.  
 
RELIGIOUS MARKETING STUDIES 
  
Religious organizations are increasingly meeting congregant needs with secular 
marketing techniques (Kenneson and Street 1997; Symonds 2005). The strategic benefits of 
religious marketing are well-documented (Drucker 1989; Schlesinger and Mellado 1991; 
Shawchuck, Kotler, Wrenn, and Rath 1992). Megachurches, like the 20,000 member Willow 
Creek Church, have revamped their offerings based on market-research surveys asking why 
people do not attend church (Schlesinger and Mellado 1991; Symonds 2005). Some churches 
employ MBAs or consulting agencies to create strategic marketing plans that address recruiting, 
atmospherics and customer service, and some synagogues are sending volunteers to 
supermarkets for Passover outreach and throwing cocktail recruiting parties (Luo 2006). 
Successful religious marketing diverges from deeply rooted sentiments – dating back to 
Martin Luther’s campaign against selling indulgences – that the faithful should defend religious 
principles against secular intrusions (Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry 1989). Anecdotal evidence 
also indicates that consumers view religious marketing as a secular-sacred breach. 
Churchmarketingsucks.com, for example, presents conspicuous forms of religious marketing: 
churches raffling Hummer SUVs to promote winter retreats (Graham 2005) or distributing free 
gasoline vouchers to first-time visitors (Beattie 2005). The academic literature also finds that 
religious advertising upsets consumers (McDaniel 1986), and the practitioner literature warns 
that marketing may undermine the sanctity of the church (e.g., Shawchuck et al. 1992). 
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How can the apparent effectiveness of religious marketing be reconciled with its potential 
for denunciation? Our framework proposes that the degree of distress caused by marketing 
hinges on the congruence between the relational norm ascribed to the organization and the norm 
ascribed to the strategy. Negative reactions should occur for religious organizations that use 
commercial marketing (i.e., market-pricing) but not communally-based marketing (i.e., 
communal sharing). Still, even when strategies have an underlying market focus, organizations 
may successfully assuage distress by communally reframing the strategy.  
 
Study 1: Religious Marketing Strategies 
 Is all religious marketing created equal? We examined whether the acceptability of 
religious marketing strategies depends on the underlying market-pricing or communal-sharing 
norms. As a point of comparison, we contrasted the acceptability of strategies intended for a 
church with those intended for a credit union, a traditionally commercial enterprise.  
Prior to the study, we surveyed whether people expected a communal-sharing focus from 
a church (N = 20). All participants endorsed this focus, in which “priorities and offerings (are) 
based on cooperative and relationship-building principles,” over a market-focus, in which 
“priorities and offerings (are) based on business and economic principles.” In contrast, only 15% 
endorsed a community-based rule for the credit union.  
  
Method 
 Thirty-two undergraduates, participating for partial course credit, were randomly 
assigned to either the church or credit union condition and told that the organization was 
considering a variety of marketing strategies “to better serve, recruit, and retain members.” Nine 
broad strategies were presented that could be viewed as either communal sharing (e.g., 
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establishing child care services) or market pricing (e.g., rebranding; see Table 1). Respondents 
were asked to judge how acceptable or unacceptable each strategy was from an “ethical, moral, 
or principled standpoint.”  
As a manipulation check, sixteen participants were randomly selected from the same 
population to judge the strategies’ relational focus and were told that an organization was 
considering using the strategies (church or credit union not mentioned). Respondents judged 
whether each strategy was communal (based on cooperative and relationship-building principles) 
or market focused (based on business and economic principles) on an eight-point scale, with 
endpoints “Community Focused” and “Market Focused.”  
______________________ 
Insert table 1 about here 
_______________________ 
 
Results 
We first examined the perceived focus (communal sharing vs. market pricing) of the 
strategies. An inspection of the ratings revealed three categories of responses: three were market-
pricing focused (M’s = 6.31 - 6.75), three were communal-sharing focused (M’s = 2.06 - 2.81), 
and three were at the midpoint (M’s = 3.69 - 4.44; table 1).   
_______________________ 
Insert figure 1 about here 
_______________________ 
 
Judgments of acceptability were also collapsed into three relational-focus categories (see 
Figure 1). We created a hierarchical regression model to test the effects of relational strategy on 
judgments of acceptability within participants. We first regressed acceptability judgments on the 
mean focus of the marketing strategy. For each participant, we calculated an unstandardized beta 
weight for the effect of the strategy on acceptability. We then regressed these beta weights on the 
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condition factor (church or credit union). The model was significant (F(1, 31) = 10.9; p < .01). 
Although there was no difference in acceptability between the church and credit union conditions 
(t(31) = 0.8; n.s.), there was a significant effect of condition on the slope (t(31) = 3.3; p < .01), 
indicating that the strategy’s relational focus influenced acceptability judgments for the church, 
but not the credit union. A mixed-model ANOVA using the three categorized means for each 
subject confirmed the hierarchical analysis. The effect of strategy type was significant: 
communal-sharing strategies were judged as more acceptable than market-pricing strategies 
(F(2, 60) = 14.9,  p < .001; η2 = .32). Respondents also rated the strategies as more acceptable for 
the credit union than the church, although the effect was not significant (F(1, 30) = 2.3; p < .14; 
η2=.07). The main effects, however, were qualified by a significant two-way interaction (F(2, 60) 
= 4.9, p < .01; η2 = .19).  
 
Discussion 
The relational focus of a marketing strategy and the nature of the enacting organization 
interact to affect the strategy’s level of acceptance. Although consumers are reluctant to accept 
commercial strategies, such as religious advertising (McDaniel 1986), we show that consumers 
approve of marketing when it is congruent with a communal nature. The relational focus of the 
strategy, however, had little effect on evaluations of the credit union, an organization with a clear 
commercial focus. Consistent with previous work, participants resisted market-pricing in the 
communal domain but accepted it elsewhere (Fiske and Tetlock 1997; McGraw et al. 2003).  
Behavioral intentions and mediation. The use of commercial-marketing strategies by 
religious organizations may have negative implications for the organization as well as 
worshippers. We conducted a brief follow-up study to examine whether perceptions of religious 
marketing influence willingness to join an organization. Fifty three undergraduates were 
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randomly assigned to one of the two most disparate marketing strategies in Table 1: providing 
childcare to members (CS) or rebranding (MP). After reading about the church’s consideration of 
the strategy, participants indicated their agreement with the statement, “I would find it 
bothersome if the church would engage in such a practice” on a seven-point scale labeled 
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” Respondents also judged, on a seven-point scale 
labeled “Very Likely” to “Very Unlikely” their willingness to join such an organization. 
Respondents were more bothered by the market-pricing strategy (M = 4.21) than the 
communal-sharing strategy (M = 2.21; t(51)=4.0, p < .001; Cohen’s d = 1.18) and less willing to 
join a religious organization that used the market-pricing strategy (M = 5.82) than the communal-
sharing strategy (M = 4.76; t(51) = 2.2, p < .05; d = .58). The degree to which respondents were 
bothered by the strategy mediated the effect on willingness to join the organizations (a x b = .82, 
95% CI = .22 to 1.51). The direct effect of marketing strategy became non-significant (c = 1.05, t 
= 2.20; c’ = .22, t = .44; p >.65), signaling indirect only mediation (Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 
2010). 
 
Study 2: Outsourcing Prayer 
We next examine reactions to a specific religious marketing strategy, outsourcing prayer, 
and tested the effectiveness of communal justifications to assuage distress. Although marketing 
is more commonly employed by non-denominational churches, traditional churches also use 
religious marketing. Many Catholic churches in the U.S. are unable to fulfill requests for Mass 
intentions (i.e., request a Mass to be celebrated for a friend or loved one) in a timely manner and 
have been outsourcing prayer requests to Priests in India (Rai 2004). The practice serves the 
needs of the congregation with a market-pricing solution: matching supply with demand. The 
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congregation can fulfill prayer requests quickly, and poorly funded Indian churches receive a 
portion of the donation. We suspect that the explicit connection to the well-known market-
pricing practice of outsourcing will distress consumers, but that communally justifying the 
practice will attenuate negative reactions.  
 
Method 
 One hundred and one undergraduates participated in the study for partial course credit. 
They learned about the Catholic Church’s decision to send Mass (i.e., prayer) requests to a 
congregation in rural India because local congregations could not keep up with demand. The 
materials outlined the practice and discussed some of the benefits to both congregations and the 
congregants (see appendix A). Within the description of the practice was one of three randomly 
assigned manipulations. Respondents were presented with a communal-sharing justification, a 
market-pricing justification, or no justification. The communal-sharing justification was:  
 From the perspective of the Catholic Church everyone is part of God’s community. It 
 does not matter to God who says the Mass. Priests, and their congregations for that 
 matter, are undifferentiated in God’s eyes. 
 
To test whether a market-pricing justification would influence feelings about the 
outsourcing prayer policy (Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz 1978), we included the following: 
From the perspective of the Catholic Church, it is a simple matter of matching supply and 
 demand in the market for prayer services – and thus maximizing prayers and revenue 
 generation on a worldwide basis. 
  
Respondents then expressed their agreement with two statements measuring their reaction 
to the policy: 1) I find it bothersome that the Church would engage in such a practice, and 2) 
The Church is not justified to enact such a policy. The anchors of the seven-point scales were 
labeled, “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.”  
13 
 
One criticism of the evidence for taboo trade-offs is that judgments are subject to 
socially-desirable responding (Johar 2005; Kahn 2005). To determine whether outsourcing 
prayer creates real distress, we examine whether consumers react as if they are tainted by taboo 
trade-offs (Tetlock, 2002). One such response to unethical deeds is to seek out physical cleansing 
opportunities (Zhong and Liljenquist 2006). To examine physical cleansing due to viewing 
outsourcing prayer in market-pricing terms, we included an ostensibly unrelated product 
preference survey for various cleansing products (Dove Shower Soap, Windex Cleaner, Crest 
Toothpaste, and Tide Laundry Detergent) and non-cleansing products (Sony CD Cases, Post-it 
Notes, Nantucket Nectars Juice, and Energizer Batteries; Zhong and Liljenquist 2006). Product 
preferences were measured on a seven-point scale, with the endpoints, “Completely 
Undesirable” and “Completely Desirable.”  
 
Results 
 The two measures of distress were coded one through seven, where higher numbers 
indicated greater distress with the policy. The correlated (r = .67; p < .001) measures were 
averaged to form a composite measure. Reactions to the market-pricing justification condition 
(M = 3.78) was not significantly different from the no-justification condition (M = 4.00), but 
reactions to each condition were significantly more distressing than reactions to the communal-
sharing justification; (M = 2.81; t(66) = 3.4, p < .01; d = .83, and t(65) = 2.6, p<.05; d = .67; p < 
.05, respectively). An ANOVA test of the relational frame manipulation was significant (F(1, 
100) = 6.2, p < .001; η2 = .11). 
We calculated a difference score of the average ratings of the cleansing and non-
cleansing products; higher numbers indicated a greater preference for the cleansing products. 
Because there were no differences in preferences in the market-pricing and no-justification 
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conditions, we pooled those responses and compared them to responses in the communal-sharing 
condition. Consistent with explicit ratings, respondents in the market-pricing and no justification 
conditions had larger difference scores than those in the communal-sharing justification 
condition (M = 0.83 vs. M = 0.35, respectively; t(99) = 2.0, p < .05; d = .43).  
 
Discussion 
  Negative reactions to the Catholic Church’s use of outsourcing prayer, a market-pricing 
practice, were assuaged by a communal-sharing justification. A market-pricing justification had 
no effect on default perceptions of the practice; moral distress with a description of outsourcing 
that contained no justification was no different from distress after a market-pricing justification. 
Furthermore, evidence of moral cleansing among consumers exposed to taboo trade-offs 
suggests they are not simply responding in socially desirable ways but are indeed morally 
distressed by the practice of outsourcing prayers.   
 
Study 3: Exacerbating Relational Justification Effects  
In order to examine the cognitive processes that underlie the effectiveness of communal 
justifications, we examined reactions to justifications for outsourcing prayer when processing is 
impaired. We expected that the justification effects shown in the previous study would be more 
pronounced when consumers are cognitively busy because they will be inclined to rely on their 
initial reaction to the rationale (Gilbert, et al. 1990). 
 
Method 
One hundred and ninety three undergraduates participated in the study for partial course 
credit. They were presented an abbreviated version of the outsourcing stimuli from Study 2 (see 
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appendix B). Respondents were randomly assigned to either the communal-sharing justification 
or the market-pricing justification.  
Prior to reading the scenario, participants were also randomly assigned to a low or high 
cognitive load condition. The low-load condition featured an eight-digit string of the same 
number, whereas the high-load condition featured an eight-digit string of different numbers 
(Gilbert and Hixon 1991; Krull, 1993).  
We assessed participants’ reactions to the policy. We presented respondents with three 
statements designed to tap into potential feelings of outrage: 1) It is outrageous for the Church to 
send prayers to India, 2) It distresses me that a religious organization would engage in such a 
practice, 3) It angers me that the Church would use this practice instead of finding another 
solution. Respondents indicated their agreement with the statement on a seven-point scale with 
anchors labeled, “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.”  
 
Results 
 Responses to the three distress-related measures were highly correlated (α = .91), so we 
formed a composite measure of distress by averaging participants’ responses. Replicating Study 
2, the low-load condition analysis revealed an effect of justification; participants in the 
communal-sharing justification condition were less distressed (M = 3.08) than those in the 
market-pricing condition (M = 3.69; t(96) = 1.96, p <  .05; d = .40; figure 2). The difference in 
judgments, however, became more pronounced when participants were under a higher load (MCS 
= 2.63 vs. MMP = 4.13; the interaction of justification and load was significant; F(1, 192) = 4.1, p 
<  .001; η2 = .02;).  
_______________________ 
Insert figure 2 about here 
_______________________ 
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Discussion 
The study replicates the effectiveness of a communal-sharing justification of a 
commercial-marketing strategy. Importantly, the study also shows the justification to become 
even more effective when consumers lack the cognitive resources to attend to the situation.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION ABOUT RELIGIOUS MARKETING 
 
 Both religious organizations and consumers can benefit from marketing. Our studies 
indicate, however, that not every religious marketing strategy is equally acceptable; religious 
marketing may backfire if its market-pricing nature is overly transparent. A compelling 
demonstration of this effect is the use of a classic market-pricing strategy, outsourcing, to 
accommodate Mass requests. Outsourcing prayer solves a real problem: the church’s inability to 
cater to all of their members. Because outsourcing prayer is also associated with corporate 
market-pricing practices, it challenges the church to communally reframe perceptions – a 
strategy that is especially effective when consumers are less questioning of the church’s motives. 
 
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING 
Although taboo trade-offs may threaten religious organizations (which have clear 
communal goals and operate in a sacred world that consumers distinguish from the marketplace; 
Belk 2005; Belk et al. 1989; Miller 2004), we investigate whether the same effect occurs in the 
highly lucrative, unquestionably for-profit enterprise of pharmaceutical marketing (Claxton et al. 
2007; Lueck 2003). We focus on pharmaceutical pricing because many people believe that “drug 
companies put profits ahead of people” (Kaiser 2005), a sentiment that is at odds with 
consumers’ preference for health-related endeavors to operate with sensitivity to communal 
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norms. For instance, 85% of undergraduates (N = 40) judged a communal focus more appropriate 
than a market-pricing focus to guide a pharmaceutical company’s business plan; only 20%, 
however, made the same judgment for a software company.  
Pharmaceutical pricing justifications provide a timely, real-world investigation of 
relational framing. Indeed, the industry is highly motivated to reduce the tension between how 
the industry operates and how consumers believe it ought to operate (Angell 2004). Consumers 
are often asked to accept higher prices to generate revenue to fund research and development – 
implicit cooperation that satisfies the communal goal of improved public health and well-being. 
Abbot Laboratories, for example, warded off boycott threats by justifying price increases as 
necessary to fund new drug research (Harris 2004). Genentech, alternatively, was rebuked for the 
$100,000 price tag of its blockbuster cancer drug, Avastin, when a company executive 
acknowledged that the price was based on the “value of innovation and the value of new 
therapies” (Berenson 2006). Thus, we expect that pricing justifications that highlight a 
company’s profit goals, in the communally-preferred domain of health, should be distressing to 
consumers -- except when a communal-sharing justification is offered.  
 
Study 4: Pharmaceutical Marketing Strategies 
Similar to Study 1, we expected that reactions to pharmaceutical marketing strategies 
would depend on their underlying relational norm. We contrasted judgments about the 
acceptability of strategies, which were either market-pricing or communal-sharing in nature, with 
judgments made for a software company, which consumers expect to act as a for-profit business. 
Both pharmaceuticals and software are otherwise similar: high research and development costs, 
low manufacturing and distribution costs, limited patent protection, and heavy demand to 
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develop new technology. In an analysis of blue-chip stocks, Microsoft was second only to Pfizer 
with the highest percentage of capital invested in R&D (Halperin 2006).  
We surveyed an adult sample (N = 1975; 61% female; Median age = 49 years) to confirm 
our assertion that consumers believe the pricing of medicine should be based on communal-
sharing rather than market-pricing principles. A greater proportion of respondents believed that 
medication should be priced according to need compared to software (86% vs. 56%, 
respectively; χ2 = 670.5; p < .001).  
 
Method 
Eighty nine undergraduates participated in the study for partial course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to either a pharmaceutical or software condition and told that the company is 
considering a variety of marketing strategies to “serve, recruit and retain customers.” The six 
marketing strategies are listed in Table 2. We included two pricing-related strategies in the 
material: the market-pricing strategy was labeled “value-based pricing” and was described, in 
part, as “selling prices based on the perceived value to the customer, instead of on other 
traditional factors like production costs or competitor’s prices.” The communal-sharing strategy 
was labeled, “ensure access for customers in need,” and was described, in part, as “create a 
special pricing program in which low-income customers can apply for and receive the 
company’s product at a lower cost.” Respondents judged how unacceptable or acceptable each 
strategy was from an “ethical, moral, or principled standpoint” on a seven-point scale with the 
end points labeled, “Completely Unacceptable” and “Completely Acceptable.”  
As a manipulation check, twenty three participants were randomly selected from the 
same population to judge the strategies’ relational focus. They were told that an organization was 
considering using the strategies (pharmaceutical or software not mentioned). Respondents judged 
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whether each strategy was communal (based on cooperative and relationship-building principles) 
or market focused (based on business and economic principles) on an eight-point scale, with 
endpoints “Community Focused” and “Market Focused.”  
______________________ 
Insert table 2 about here 
_______________________ 
 
Result 
We first examined the perceived focus (communal sharing vs. market pricing) of the 
strategies on the eight-point response scale (coded one through eight), with higher numbers 
indicating greater market focus. Three means indicated a market-pricing focus (M’s = 6.13 – 
6.65) and three indicated a communal-sharing focus (M’s = 2.48 – 2.78; table 2). 
____________________________ 
Insert figure 3 about here 
____________________________ 
 
Judgments of acceptability for the six strategies were coded one through seven, with 
higher numbers indicating greater acceptance. Panel A of Figure 3 shows the data collapsed into 
the two relational-focus categories. We created a hierarchical regression model to test the effects 
of the underlying relational strategy on judgments of acceptability within participants. We first 
regressed acceptability judgments on the mean focus of the marketing strategy. For each 
participant, we calculated an unstandardized beta weight for the effect of the strategy on judged 
acceptability. We then regressed these beta weights on the condition factor (pharmaceutical or 
software). The model was significant (F(1, 87) = 9.5; p < .001). There was no effect of condition 
on the intercept (t(85) = 0.1; n.s.), which indicated no difference in acceptability between the 
pharmaceutical and software conditions. However, there was a significant effect of condition on 
the slope (t(87) = 3.1; p < .01), which indicated that the strategy’s relational focus had little 
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effect on acceptability judgments for the software company but a significant effect for the 
pharmaceutical company. A mixed-model ANOVA using the two categorized means for each 
subject confirmed the analysis. The effect of strategy type was significant; communal-sharing 
strategies were judged more acceptable than market-pricing strategies (F(1, 87)=33.5, p < .001; 
η2=.28). Respondents also judged the strategies to be more acceptable for a software than a 
pharmaceutical company (F(1, 87)=10.9, p < .001; η2=.11). The main effects, however, were 
qualified by a significant two-way interaction (F(1, 87)=9.4,  p < .01; η2=10). 
The two marketing strategies that referred to pricing decisions are the focus of our 
subsequent studies. We examined the interaction of “value pricing” and “ensuring access” 
depending on the type of company (see Figure 3, panel B; F(1, 87) = 11.0, p <.001; η2 = .11). 
The value-pricing strategy was judged more acceptable for a software company than for a 
pharmaceutical company (t(87) = 2.8, p < .01; d = .58), but the reverse occurred for ensuring 
access to customers (t(87) = 1.9, p < .06; d = .38).   
 
Discussion  
Our proposed taboo trade-off effect holds in the for-profit context of healthcare. The 
communal-sharing or market-pricing nature of a marketing strategy had little effect on judgments 
of acceptability for a software company but a substantial effect for a pharmaceutical company.  
Behavioral intentions. Pharmaceutical pricing decisions showed the largest differences in 
acceptance due to the strategy’s relational focus. Thus, we conducted a brief follow-up study to 
examine consumer backlash against market-pricing versus communal-sharing pricing strategies. 
Eight hundred and sixty three adults (54% female; median age = 56 years) were randomly 
assigned to one of the two pricing strategies from Table 2: value-based pricing (market-pricing) 
or ensuring accessibility to patients (communal-sharing). After reading about a pharmaceutical 
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company that is considering using the (randomly assigned) strategy, participants indicated their 
agreement to the statement, “I would find it bothersome if the company would engage in such a 
practice,” on a seven-point scale labeled, “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.”  
Respondents also judged on a seven-point scale labeled, “Extremely Unlikely” and “Extremely 
Likely” how likely they were to engage in behaviors due to the company’s actions. Items: 1) 
Complain to a family member, friend, or co-worker about this pharmaceutical company, 2) Ask 
your doctor to prescribe a generic drug instead of a drug from this company the next time you 
are sick, and 3) Volunteer for a letter-writing campaign that encourages the government to allow 
more than one company to produce patented drugs in order to increase competition and lower 
prices. 
The measure of distress was coded one through seven, where higher numbers indicated 
greater agreement. Respondents were more bothered by the market-pricing strategy (M = 4.97) 
than the communal-sharing strategy (M = 2.65; t(861) = 17.9, p < .001; d = 1.26). The measures 
of behavioral intentions were coded one through seven, where higher numbers indicated higher 
reported intentions to engage in behaviors detrimental to the company. Respondents were more 
likely to report that they would complain (M = 5.23 vs. 3.05; t(861) = 16.6, p < .001; d = 1.10), 
ask for generic drugs (M = 3.98 vs. 2.26; t(861) = 12.8, p < 001; d = .87), and volunteer for a 
letter-writing campaign (M = 4.56 vs. 3.77; t(861) = 5.5, p < .01; d = .38) when the value-based-
pricing strategy was employed.  
 
Study 5: Justifying Pricing Decisions 
We have shown that reactions to pricing decisions differ between the pharmaceutical 
industry and the software industry. Next, we test whether relationally reframing market-pricing 
actions with communal-sharing justifications influences consumer distress in the two industries. 
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Although we expect an effect of communal-sharing justification in the pharmaceutical domain, 
we suspect that the justification will not be as influential in the software domain because the 
market-pricing goals of the industry are already known and accepted. We use a common 
justification for the pharmaceutical industry based on findings by Kahneman, Knestch, and 
Thaler (1986a, 1986b), showing that price increases as the result of pass-through costs (such as 
research and development) were deemed considered more fair than those based on market 
considerations (e.g., increased demand). 
 
Method 
Two hundred and forty two adult participants (57% female; median age = 46 years) 
participated in a paid web-based survey. They were randomly assigned to review statements 
from either a pharmaceutical or software company that lost $50 million developing a new 
product (drug or software program, respectively). The company was considering raising the price 
of a popular product to make up for the losses (see appendix C). Participants were randomly 
presented a communal-sharing justification (“in order to continue their ground-breaking research 
and development of medicines that benefit everyone”) or a market-pricing justification (“in order 
to continue record-breaking profits that benefit investors”). Participants were then presented the 
statements: “This is a fair pricing strategy” and “I support the use of this pricing strategy,” and 
responded on a seven-point scale from, “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” 
  
Results 
Responses were coded one through seven, where higher numbers indicated greater 
disagreement. The measures were highly correlated (r = .90; p < .001), so we computed a 
composite variable of distress by averaging responses. Panel A of Figure 4 shows the mean 
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distress rating by relational justification and company type. The results show a main effect of 
industry where respondents were more distressed with raising drug prices than software prices, 
(F(1,238) = 7.74, p < .001;η2 = .03). There was also a main effect of relational frame, (F(1,238) = 
5.5, p < .05; η2 = .02), where respondents were more distressed with the market-pricing 
justification than with the communal-sharing justification. The main effects were qualified by a 
significant company by relational-frame interaction, (F(1,238) = 5.4, p < .05; η2 = .02), showing 
that although communal-sharing justifications reduce consumer distress over price increases for 
drugs (MMP = 5.56 vs. MCS = 4.61; t(121) = 3.2, p < .01; d = .58), the same pattern does not hold 
true for software (MMP = 4.53 vs. MCS = 4.53; n.s.). Regardless of how the price increase was 
justified for the software, participants experienced less distress.  
 
Discussion 
Consumers are averse to market-pricing justifications for goods that they feel should be 
governed by communal rules. Moreover, communal-sharing justifications mitigate distress by 
making consumers feel that costs are necessary for community well-being. Communally 
reframed pharmaceutical pricing strategies, furthermore, reduce distress to levels associated with 
pricing strategies used by the software industry.   
_______________________ 
Insert figure 4 about here 
_______________________ 
 
 
Study 6: Need-based vs. Value-based Drugs 
A substantial literature examines the fairness of various pricing strategies as perceived by 
consumers and finds that fairness is influenced by the product type and the harm caused by high 
prices (Bolton Warlop and Alba 2003; Campbell 1999; Kahneman et al. 1986a, 1986b). For 
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instance, the failure of a firm to reduce prices when costs go down is judged to be more unfair 
when the product is a drug than when it is furniture (Campbell 2008).   
We suspect that the necessity and potentially lifesaving properties of medicine leads 
consumers to believe that healthcare companies should have a strong communal focus. Next, we 
set out to test differences in perceptions of value-based pricing strategies for drugs that the public 
believes should subject to communal or market rules. Only when consumers believe that the drug 
price should be governed by communal rules should communal-sharing justifications be 
necessary and effective.  
Before the study, we confirmed that consumers believe that the pricing of lifesaving 
drugs as opposed to life-enhancing drugs should be based on communal-sharing principles. We 
asked undergraduates (N = 81) how a cholesterol-lowering or an anti-wrinkle drug should be 
priced. A majority (62%) indicated that an anti-cholesterol drug should be priced according to 
the needs and means of the patient rather than according to the demands of the marketplace. In 
contrast, only 28% made the same judgment for an anti-wrinkle drug.  
 
Method 
Two hundred and thirty seven undergraduates were entered into a lottery in exchange for 
completing a web survey. They reviewed statements from the CEO of a pharmaceutical company 
who is considering raising prices on a popular drug to make up for R&D losses on another drug. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a condition where the price of either an anti-cholesterol 
or anti-wrinkle drug was raised because of losses on another similar drug. They were also 
randomly assigned to a condition in which the price increase was accompanied by a communal-
justification (“continue researching and developing drugs that benefit everyone”) or a market-
pricing justification (“ensure revenues and profits for a healthy bottom line”; see appendix D). 
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Participants were then presented the statements: “This is a fair pricing strategy” and “I support 
the use of this pricing strategy,” and responded on a seven-point scale labeled, “Strongly Agree” 
to “Strongly Disagree.” 
 
Results 
 Responses to the measures were coded as in Study 6 and were highly correlated (r = .88; 
p < .001), so we computed a distress variable by averaging responses. Panel B of Figure 4 shows 
mean distress rating by justification and medication type. The results show a main effect of 
medication type, (F(1,233) = 18.9,  p < .001, η2 = .08), in which participants were more 
distressed at the suggested price increase for the cholesterol drug than for the anti-wrinkle drug. 
There was also a main effect of relational frame, (F(1,233) = 4.9, p < .05; η2 = .02), indicating 
that respondents were more distressed by market-pricing justifications than communal-sharing 
justifications. Consistent with our predictions, the main effects were qualified by a relational 
frame by drug type interaction in which the communal-sharing justification reduced discomfort 
for the cholesterol drug (MMP = 4.53 vs. MCS = 3.47; t(125) = 3.0, p < .05; d = .70) but not for the 
anti-wrinkle drug (MMP = 3.0 vs. MCS = 32.95; t(109) = .3; n.s.). Regardless of how the price 
increase was justified for the anti-wrinkle drug, participants experienced identical levels of 
distress. 
 
Discussion 
 Communal-sharing justifications do not reduce distress for just any drug – consumers 
need to believe the drug is truly essential. Relative to a market-pricing justification, the 
communal-sharing justification assuaged consumer distress due to a price increase of a lifesaving 
drug but had no effect over the same price increase on a cosmetic drug. 
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Study 7: Attenuating Relational Justification Effects 
In our final study, we investigate how the differential effectiveness of communal and 
market justifications might be decreased. Our studies demonstrate that communal justifications 
are typically preferred over market justifications for increases in drug price. However, when 
explicitly asked, most consumers acknowledge that the pharmaceutical industry is profit-driven 
(Kaiser 2005). Given the tension between what consumers want and their recognition of reality, 
we examine what occurs when consumers consider the intentions of organizations. To do so, we 
use a persuasion-knowledge priming procedure, which should encourage consumers to probe the 
veracity of the organization’s claims (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Friestad and Wright 1995). 
We suspect that when consumers consider the organizations’ intentions, the market-pricing 
justification will be viewed less negatively because the pharmaceutical company is at least 
honest about its financial obligations. The effectiveness of the communal-sharing justification, 
by contrast, may in turn decline because it now conflicts with the company’s market-pricing 
obligations.  
 
Method 
One hundred and fifty eight participants (55% female; median age = 46.5 years) 
participated in a paid web-based survey. The study was presented in two seemingly unrelated 
sections. Participants were randomly assigned to condition based on Campbell and Kirmani 
(2000). In the condition where participants are primed with persuasion-knowledge, participants 
are asked to write about how they will persuade a friend to help on a seemingly unpleasant task: 
We would like you to make plans. Imagine that you have to bring a task home from work. The 
task is so big that you are going to need to work on it for most of the weekend - and you still 
might not get it done. It would be helpful if you can get a friend of yours who is good at the 
27 
 
task to help you. The friend, however, is very busy, and so you need to persuade him to help.  
Please list the (several) ways that you would use to make sure that the friend assists you. 
In the no-prime condition, the planning task did not involve a persuasion attempt:   
We would like you to make plans. Imagine that you have a friend staying with you. He is in 
town for business and is working on a big task over the weekend. The task is so big that he is 
going to need to work on it for most of the weekend – and he still might not get it done. You 
know that you should not disturb him while he is working and so you need to figure out how 
to do that. Please list the (several) ways that you would use to make sure that you did not 
disturb your friend while he works. 
Participants were thanked for their participation and told they were moving on to a new study 
(which was presented in a different font and format). Participants then reviewed the pricing 
strategy scenario from Study 5 and were randomly assigned to either the communal-sharing or 
market-pricing justifications (see appendix C). Respondents expressed their agreement with three 
statements designed to measure reaction to the policy: 1) This is a fair pricing strategy, 2) I 
support the use of this pricing strategy, and 3) I am upset by this pricing strategy. The anchors of 
the seven-point scales were labeled, “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree.” In the no-prime 
condition we expected to replicate the previous relational framing effect, but when the prime was 
present, the difference in reactions to the two justifications would be reduced. 
 
Results 
 The measures were highly correlated (α = .81) and averaged into a composite of 
consumer distress (reverse coding the ratings of how upset respondents were). Overall, neither 
main effect of justification nor that of the request was significant; however, an ANOVA revealed 
a significant interaction (F(1, 514) = 4.2, p < .05; η2 = .03; see panel c of figure 4). Although 
communal-sharing justifications reduce distress over price increases for drugs (MMP = 5.86 vs. 
MCS = 4.97; t(77) = 2.6, p < .05; d = .60), the same pattern did not hold true when persuasion 
knowledge was primed (MMP = 5.21 vs. MCS = 5.29; n.s.). Regardless of how the price increase 
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was justified, participants experienced the same amount of distress when primed with 
persuasion-knowledge. 
 
Discussion 
 Communal-sharing justifications do not always reduce pricing distress, and nor do 
market-pricing justifications always increase pricing distress. However, we find a predictable 
and robust pattern showing that these justifications are polarizing, particularly when consumers 
are unmotivated to consider an organization’s goals. As discussed previously, consumers 
understand that pharmaceutical companies operate in a for-profit manner but prefer a communal 
approach. When suspicions are aroused, however, acknowledging a market-pricing orientation 
may in some ways benefit the organization. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING 
 
We tested the effectiveness of relational framing in the domain of healthcare, where 
market-pricing is often considered a taboo trade-off. Consumers feel greater distress when a 
pharmaceutical (as opposed to a software company) used commercial marketing. The effect 
occurs because consumers are more inclined to think that the pharmaceutical industry has a 
communal obligation to promote well-being. Thus, pharmaceutical industry appeals to accept 
higher prices for communal benefits are more effective at reducing outrage than software 
industry appeals. This pattern is limited, however, to drugs that serve life-saving or extending 
functions, and not to those that serve a cosmetic function. We thus see converging evidence that 
consumers are sensitive to trade-offs in a predictable way. Consumers react strongly when a 
taboo trade-off has been committed, but can be assuaged if convinced that their money benefits 
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the greater good. Still, when consumers are encouraged to question the organization’s motives, 
the advantage the communal justification has over the market-pricing is eliminated. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
  
Marketing commonly adds value to consumer experience and builds brand relationships. 
However, certain tactics are distressing when consumers believe that organizations, like churches 
or pharmaceutical companies, ought to act in communal ways. Indeed, religious advertising is 
often considered unacceptable (McDaniel 1986), pastors are criticized for recruiting youngsters 
by hosting violent video game nights (Richtel 2007), and consumers are upset by the value-based 
pricing of life-saving drugs (Berenson 2006).  
We draw on Fiske’s relational theory (1991, 1992) as a framework that delineates rules 
governing interpersonal and organizational exchanges, and contrast the two most dissonant 
normative categories: market pricing and communal sharing (McGraw et al. 2003). Communal-
sharing rules are grounded in deontic principles whereas market-pricing rules are grounded in 
utilitarianism. Consumers become upset and can even lash out when organizations use market-
pricing in communal domains because they see an organization placing profits over people. 
Consumers, however, do not see taboo trade-offs when market-pricing occurs in secular 
domains, such as credit unions, software companies and drug companies selling cosmetic drugs. 
 
Relational Framing 
People intuitively grasp relationship norms and view their misapplication as taboo (Fiske 
and Tetlock 1997). We investigated the effect of disguising taboo trade-offs by relationally 
framing commercial-marketing strategies as communally beneficial (McGraw and Tetlock 
2005). When a religious or healthcare organization uses a communally-focused relational 
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justification, consumers are less likely to turn against it. 
What influences the effectiveness of relational framing? We began with the assumption 
that people are motivated to avoid distress and that uncovering taboo trade-offs is effortful and 
upsetting (Erhlich and Irwin 2005). Of special relevance to relational framing is the tendency to 
reinterpret situations so that they are not emotionally disruptive (Gross 1998, 2002). Relational 
framing facilitates the emotion regulation process that, we suspect, will be especially effective 
when consumers are motivated to accept an organization’s justifications. Sympathizers should 
engage in motivated reasoning that plays up the credibility and moral force of justifications 
(Kunda 1990; K. M. McGraw 2001). Conversely, critics should generate more counterarguments 
to neutralize industry-offered justifications (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, and 
Schumann 1983). In a pilot for the outsourcing prayer study, for example, we found that certain 
consumers were more influenced by communal justifications (Attaway, Boles, and Singley 1997; 
McDaniel and Burnett 1990). Participants (N = 106) read about a church outsourcing prayer to 
Indian Priests and were randomly assigned to the communal-sharing or market-pricing 
justification. Religious service attendance moderated the effect of communal-sharing 
justifications but not market-pricing justifications. That is, respondents who endorsed attending 
services regularly or occasionally (i.e., the “churched”) were more assuaged by the communal-
sharing justification than those who endorsed never or rarely attending (i.e., the “unchurched”), 
suggesting that those who care more about the church were more persuaded by the justification.  
There are good reasons for suspecting that organizations will often succeed in reframing 
their taboo trade-offs. Organizations typically have much a stronger interest in concealing taboo 
trade-offs than individuals have in uncovering them. Organizations also have substantial 
resources—personnel, capital, and access to media—to craft and communicate effective 
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reframing messages. The results of our studies indicate that, insofar as most of the public is not 
concerned with monitoring church or corporate misconduct at any given moment (most people 
have more pressing priorities; Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Tuk et al. 2009), organizations have 
considerable public-relations latitude to justify norm violations. Our findings are also consistent 
with: (a) Gilbert et al.’s (1990) Spinozan hypothesis that our first reaction to new information is 
to believe it and that disbelieving requires greater cognitive effort, (b) Langer et al.’s (1978) 
demonstration that even vacuous accounts are effective in justifying norm violations as long as 
the timing and context is right, and (c) Tetlock’s (1981) demonstration that the self-flattering 
content of justifications is a more powerful predictor of their efficacy than their plausibility.   
 
Sacred Values 
The reactions to taboo trade-offs due to commercial marketing are consistent with moral 
psychology research that documents outrage reactions to pitting secular against sacred values 
(Baron and Spranca 1997; Rozin et al. 1999; Haidt 2001; Rai and Fiske 2011; Tetlock et al. 
2000). Most people, atheists included, insist that certain values are sacred and that it is 
unacceptable to mix them with secular values like money (Durkheim 1925). Sacredness qualifies 
as a distinct normative standard of conduct, despite the variation in what things various groups 
hold sacred and how they uphold their values (Aberle et al. 1950; Belk et al. 1989).   
A deep tension exists between what people consider ideologically off-limits and the 
reality that we live in a world of finite resources in which dispassionately making trade-offs is a 
defining feature of rationality (Bartels 2008). There are strong cases for expanding market 
mechanisms into domains where many feel they do not belong: organs (Barnett et al. 1992), 
adoptions (Landes and Posner 1978), pollution credits (Hahn 1989), and prediction markets for 
terrorism futures (Weber and Tetlock 2003). These arguments lead to anxiety about the 
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legitimacy of institutions (Shiller, Boycko, and Korobov 1991; Sondak and Tyler 2007) and a 
desire to escape markets (Kozinets 2002). Our results identify one method of justifying the 
expansion of market-pricing into new domains; a method that can, of course, be achieved by 
invoking the “greater good.”   
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Churches and pharmaceutical companies are compelling case studies because of 
widespread anecdotal evidence that their commercial marketing is distressing to consumers. 
Future research should examine our effects in other domains. For example, companies that 
provide strong need-based products and services with inelastic demand (e.g., utilities, hospitals, 
oil companies) should be subject to backlash from commercial marketing—and may already be 
experimenting with ways to reframe their inherent taboo trade-offs. 
At the outset we suggested that commercial marketing and communal justifications have 
important implications for consumer goals. Although we find evidence of shifting intentions to 
disengage from religious activities (Study 1) and to lobby against patent restrictions (Study 4), 
future work would benefit from tests of behavioral follow-through.  
Although our studies use relational justifications inspired by naturally occurring cases in 
the marketplace, our studies could be criticized from a stimulus sampling perspective: our effects 
may have been overly influenced by the particular justifications that we selected. Communal 
justifications may have other mediators besides moral distress that are worthy of future 
investigation. For instance, communal-sharing justifications may signal an organization that is 
warm and caring, which could drive the justification’s impact (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 
2010). We can partially dismiss this explanation by pointing to the interaction in Study 5, in 
which communal-sharing justifications had no effect for a software company.  
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The use of hybrid justifications is a particularly interesting area to examine, especially 
given the results of Study 7 and research on the effectiveness of two-sided arguments in 
checking counter-arguing (Lumsdaine and Janis 1953). Consider this quote from Billy Tauzin, 
president of PhRMA, a pharmaceutical industry lobbying organization (www.phrma.org)  
“... truth is that we are - as an industry - focused on one thing: the patient. Granted, we're 
a business - a pretty darn big business. But we're a business OF people working FOR 
people. We make lives better through better health.” [Emphasis original.] 
 
Research should explore whether these sorts of complex justifications, that highlight both the 
market pricing means and the communal objectives of the organization, are effective even when 
consumers have been alerted to persuasive intent. Indeed, if anyone has rightly identified the 
right formula, it is likely to be a lobbying organization.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Stimulus materials presented to respondents in Study 2. 
 
The Catholic Church has a long-standing practice that allows for a Mass to be said in honor of 
someone who has died, is ill or has some other special need. The person requesting the Mass 
customarily offers about $20 as a donation for each Mass.   
 
Note: A Mass is a Catholic service where there are Biblical readings, sermons, and offerings. A 
Mass may or may not be attended by members of the congregation or by the person requesting it. 
 
The Catholic Church in the U.S. cannot always keep up with requests for Masses by their local 
congregations. Demand is too high and the supply of priests is too low. Because a single Mass is 
dedicated to a single individual, there is often a long waiting list to have a requested Mass said. 
Suppose the Catholic Church, however, has many priests available to fulfill this need in rural 
congregations in India, and these Masses can be conducted rather quickly. Consequently, the 
Catholic Church in the U.S. has been sending prayer requests to these other Churches.  
The practice is mutually beneficial to both Churches. The local congregation keeps some of the 
donation and is able to fulfill the needs of its congregation, and the Church receiving the prayer 
request keeps the remainder of the donation to help with expenses.  
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APPENDIX B 
Stimulus materials presented to respondents in Study 3. 
The Catholic Church allows for a Mass to be dedicated to someone in need. The person 
requesting the Mass customarily offers a donation (~$20) with the request.   
 Note: A Mass is a Catholic service where there are Biblical readings, sermons, offerings, and 
prayer. The requested Mass may or may not be attended by members of the congregation or by 
the person requesting it. 
The Catholic Church in the U.S. cannot always keep up with Mass requests by their local 
congregations. However, the Church has many priests in India who are available to fulfill the 
requests in a timely manner. Consequently, the Catholic Church in the U.S. has been sending 
these prayer requests to India. The U.S. Church keeps some of the donation and sends a portion 
to the Church in India. 
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APPENDIX C 
Stimulus materials presented to respondents in Study 5 and 7. 
Pharmaceutical company/Communal-sharing justification 
 
A small promising pharmaceutical company suffers a $50 million loss developing a new drug. In 
order to continue their ground-breaking research and development of medicines that benefit 
everyone, the company is considering making up for the loss by raising the price of a popular 
medication. 
 
Pharmaceutical company/Market-pricing justification 
 
A small promising pharmaceutical company suffers a $50 million loss developing a new drug. In 
order to continue achieving record-breaking profits and revenues that benefit investors, the 
company is considering making up for the loss by raising the price of a popular medication. 
 
Software company/Communal-sharing justification 
 
A small promising software company suffers a $50 million loss developing a new software 
program. In order to continue their ground-breaking research and development of software that 
benefit everyone, the company is considering making up for the loss by raising the price of a 
popular software program. 
 
Software company/Market-pricing justification 
 
A small promising software company suffers a $50 million loss developing a new software 
program. In order to continue achieving record-breaking profits and revenues that benefit 
investors, the company is considering making up for the loss by raising the price of a popular 
software program. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Stimulus materials presented to respondents in Study 6. 
Communal-sharing justification 
 
A large pharmaceutical company reports a $50 million loss on the research and development of a 
new cholesterol lowering medication. The loss occurred because a rival drug company has just 
received approval for their [anti-wrinkle drug/cholesterol lowering drug], which is both more 
effective and has fewer side effects than the other drug. A $50 million loss is not uncommon 
during research and development but in order to continue bringing safe and effective drugs to the 
public such losses must be made up for elsewhere. The CEO of the company thinks that one way 
to minimize the loss is to raise prices on a drug that is in high demand. Specifically, his company 
can recoup their $50 million loss by raising the price of their highly successful and popular 
[cholesterol lowering medication/anti-wrinkle treatment]. In doing that the company ensures 
that research and development continues for drugs that benefit everyone.   
 
Market-pricing justification 
 
A large pharmaceutical company reports a $50 million loss on the research and development of a 
new [anti-wrinkle treatment/cholesterol lowering medication]. The loss occurred because a 
rival drug company has just received approval for their [anti-wrinkle drug/cholesterol 
lowering drug], which is both more effective and has fewer side effects than the other drug. A 
$50 million loss is not uncommon during research and development but in order to continue 
bringing safe and effective drugs to the public such losses must be made up for elsewhere. The 
CEO of the company thinks that one way to minimize the loss is to raise prices on a drug that is 
in high demand. Specifically, his company can recoup their $50 million loss by raising the price 
of their highly successful and popular [cholesterol lowering medication/anti-wrinkle 
treatment]. In doing that the company ensures revenues and profits for a healthy bottom line.   
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Table 1: Marketing strategies presented in study 1. Mean focus (Focus) indicates the degree that 
the strategy was judged to be market-pricing (MP), mixed, or communal-sharing (CS). Higher 
numbers indicate a greater MP focus. Acceptability ratings are shown for the Credit Union 
(Credit) and Church (Church) conditions. Higher numbers indicate greater acceptance of the 
strategy.  
 
MP-focused Strategies Focus Credit Church
Institute a rebranding plan. For example, hire a consulting company to analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of the organization and its image. Make changes to the organization’s name, logo, 
building, and enact marketing communications based on the analysis. 
6.75 5.53 3.47
Establish superiority of the organization through advertising. For example engage television, 
radio, newspaper, or outdoor advertising that highlights excellent aspects of the organization in order 
to spread the word to current and potential members. 
6.50 5.47 4.65
Hire a celebrity endorser. For example, pay someone that potential members are familiar with to be 
the spokesperson for the organization. This person will be featured in print and television 
advertisements, as well as speaking engagements. 
6.31 4.47 3.06
Mixed-focused Strategies Focus Credit Church
Affiliate with other similar organizations. For example, find similar, like-minded organizations and 
build coalitions that pool resources and allow members to utilize the other organizations resources. 4.44 5.12 5.14
Host a fair to show organization’s offerings. For example, invite members and potential members 
to tell them about the services the organization provides. Serve food and drink, and have the 
organization’s leadership present to meet members. 
4.38 5.67 5.47
Institute a “tell your family or friend” campaign. For example, ask current members reach out to 
people who are close to them to inform them about the organization and how it can serve their needs. 3.69 5.00 4.65
CS-focused Strategies Focus Credit Church
 Create open-enrollment classes and workshops. For example, invite members and non-members 
to classes that provide relevant information about issues that are related to the organization’s mission. 
The classes will be taught by leaders or members in the organization. 
2.81 5.47 5.18
Create an online forum for members. For example, include online message boards and a blog on 
the organization’s webpage in which members can communicate with one another and help address 
issues related to the organization’s mission.
2.56 5.40 5.76
Establish services for members’ children. For example, provide free child care while members visit 
the organization. Also, build a playground on the grounds so children have something to do while 
adults are involved with the organization. 
2.06 5.67 5.82
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Table 2 Marketing strategies presented in Study 4. Mean focus (Focus) indicates the degree that 
the strategy is market-pricing (MP), mixed, or communal-sharing (CS). Higher numbers indicate 
a greater MP focus. Acceptability ratings are shown for the software company (Software) and 
pharmaceutical company (Pharma) conditions. Higher numbers indicate greater acceptance of 
the strategy.  
 
 
MP-focused Strategies Focus Software Pharma
Institute a rebranding plan. For example, hire a consulting company to analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of the organization and its image. Make changes to the organization’s name, logo, 
building, and enact marketing communications based on the analysis. 
6.65 6.39 5.86
Engage in value-based pricing. Engage in value-based pricing. For example, set selling prices based 
on the perceived value to the customer, instead of on other traditional factors like production costs or 
competitor’s prices. The company chooses a price that takes into account how much consumers value 
the product in order to maximize the company’s profit and competitive advantage. 
6.26 4.87 3.86
Hire a celebrity endorser. For example, pay someone that potential members are familiar with to be 
the spokesperson for the organization. This person will be featured in print and television 
advertisements, as well as speaking engagements. 
6.13 6.0 5.00
CS-focused Strategies Focus Software Pharma
Create an online forum for members. For example, include online message boards and a blog on the 
organization’s webpage in which members can communicate with one another and help address issues 
related to the organization’s mission. 
2.78 6.67 6.19
 Create open-enrollment classes and workshops. For example, invite members and non-members 
to classes that provide relevant information about issues that are related to the organization’s mission. 
The classes will be taught by leaders or members in the organization.
2.83 6.38 5.80
Ensure access for customers in need. For example, create a special pricing program in which low-
income customers can apply for and receive the company’s product at a lower cost. The program would 
also help those customers with informational support about the company’s products. 
2.48 5.26 5.91
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Figure 1. Mean acceptability ratings plotted for a credit union or church in Study 1. Separate 
bars show acceptability ratings for the judged relational focus of the marketing strategy 
(Community focused; Market/Community; and Market focused). Error bars represent one 
standard error above the mean. 
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Figure 2. Mean distress ratings caused by a church outsourcing prayer plotted for the communal-
sharing (black bars) or market-pricing (grey bars) justification in Study 3. The effects are shown 
separately for whether participants were under low or high cognitive load. Error bars represent 
one standard error above the mean. 
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Figure 3. Panel A shows mean acceptability ratings plotted for a software company or a 
pharmaceutical company in Study 4. Separate bars show a communal-sharing (black bars) or 
market-pricing (grey bars) focus. Panel B shows mean acceptability ratings for a software 
company or a pharmaceutical company. Separate bars show the ensuring access focus (black 
bars) or value pricing focus (grey bars). Error bars represent one standard error above the mean. 
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Figure 4. Separate bars depict a communal-sharing (black bars) or market-pricing (grey bars) 
justification. Panel A shows mean distress with the companies pricing strategy as a function of 
the justification (market-pricing or communal sharing) in Study 5. The communal-sharing 
justification significantly reduces distress for the pharmaceutical condition. However, for 
software the justification condition had a non significant-effect on distress. Panel B shows mean 
distress with the companies pricing strategy as a function of the justification (market pricing or 
communal sharing) in Study 6. The communal-sharing justification significantly reduces distress 
for the anti-cholesterol drug (cholesterol) condition. However, for the anti-wrinkle drug 
(wrinkle) the justification condition had a non significant effect on distress. Panel C shows mean 
distress with the companies pricing strategy plotted for the communal-sharing or market-pricing 
justification in Study 7. Persuasion knowledge was either primed or not in the study. The 
communal-sharing justification significantly reduces distress when persuasion knowledge is not 
primed. However, when persuasion knowledge is primed there is no difference between 
justification conditions. Error bars represent one standard error above the mean. 
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